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RED VERSUS BLUE (AND PURPLE) STATES AND THE 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE: FROM VALUES 
POLARIZATION TO COMMON GROUND? 
Linda C. McClain∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE “VALUES” QUESTION 
What is the role of courts in circumstances of “values polarization”?  This 
question is one of several subsumed under this symposium’s broad topic: “Red 
State v. Blue State: The Judicial Role in the Era of Partisanship.”  As a threshold 
matter, framing the issue in terms of “values polarization” invites two questions: 
Why frame the problem this way?  What does this framing reveal about how this 
problem resembles or differs from other problems concerning conflicts over 
values?  Consider several alternative ways to ask about values and the role of 
courts, some of which may sound familiar: What is the judicial role in 
circumstances of moral disagreement?  Of moral conflict?  Or, of 
“conscientious,” “fundamental,” or perhaps “intractable” moral conflict?  
Another framing, inspired by liberal political theory, would ask about the role in 
courts given value pluralism (a term that symposium contributor William Galston 
has used) or (in the familiar formulation of John Rawls’ political liberalism) the 
“fact of reasonable pluralism”?1  
Still another way to frame the question might be to interrogate the extent to 
which political majorities have a right “to establish or protect the moral premises 
of a community[.]”2  How far, for example, should majorities “prevail in 
determining ‘what kind of a people we are,’” and if so, “is a simple majority 
sufficient,” or must there be “broader consensus”?3  And what role should courts 
play in protecting minorities?  Legal scholars, political theorists, and 
commentators debated such questions two decades ago after the United States 
Supreme Court’s controversial decision, Bowers v. Hardwick,4 in which it upheld 
Georgia’s sodomy law as enforceable against same-sex sodomy.5  In 2003, the 
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presented an earlier draft of this article at the Symposium, Red State v. Blue State: The Judicial 
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1 WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR 
POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2002); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993). 
2 Sanford Kadish, Foreword, 77 CAL. L. REV. 475, 477 (1989) (introducing Symposium, Law, 
Community, and Moral Reasoning). 
3 Id. 
4 478 U.S. 186 (1986).   
5 See Symposium, Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CAL. L. REV. 475 (1989).  In that 
symposium, for example, Michael Sandel faulted the majority and the dissent for failing to make 
substantive moral arguments.  Michael A. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: 
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989).  In other work, Jim Fleming and I have 
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Court, in Lawrence v. Texas,6 overruled Bowers and its language about liberty 
presuming “an autonomy of self”7 in certain intimate decision making, which 
was violated by using criminal law as a tool to enforce moral judgments about 
consensual, private, adult sexual activity, sparked a fresh round of commentary 
about law and morality – as well as political activism around the issue of same-
sex marriage.8  Lawrence drew upon the Court’s much-discussed statements in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey about constitutional liberty and personhood 
entailing a right of autonomous decision-making in matters of procreation, 
marriage, and parenthood.9  In explaining the liberty of a pregnant woman to 
decide whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy, Casey affirmed but also 
departed from Roe v. Wade,10 the landmark and still controversial case in which 
the Court struck down Texas’ (and, by implication, other states’) criminal law 
prohibiting abortion.  Countless pages continue to be devoted to debating not 
only the morality of abortion, but also whether “constitutionalizing” women’s 
rights was a proper or prudent exercise of federal judicial power, or instead 
whether this judicial resolution intruded on a proper democratic resolution and 
contributed to abortion’s symbolic place in an ongoing cultural war.11 
How does the contemporary inquiry about courts and “values polarization” 
differ from these alternative formulations and these earlier debates?  First, by 
definition, “polarization” connotes “a division into two opposites,” a 
“concentration about opposing extremes of groups or interests formerly ranged 
                                                                                                                         
addressed Sandel’s critique as well as Cass Sunstein’s contrasting call for judicial minimalism.  
James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L. REV. 509 
(1997); see also JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF 
AUTONOMY 141-71 (2006) (further critiquing Sandel).  
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
7 Id. at 562. 
8 For examples of commentary on Lawrence, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Marc 
Spindelman, Foreward, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057 (2004) (introducing Symposium, Equality, Privacy 
and Lesbian and Gay Rights after Lawrence v. Texas).  Both the majority opinion in Lawrence and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, warning that judicially-imposed same-sex marriage followed from that 
opinion, featured in – perhaps even “ignited” – efforts to “protect” marriage by passing “defense of 
marriage laws” and a federal marriage amendment.  See Michael Klarman, Brown and Lawrence 
(and Goodridge), 104 U. Mich. L. Rev. 431 (2005).  In other work, I have elaborated an account of 
liberal toleration and discussed both abortion and homosexuality.  See Linda C. McClain, 
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: From “Empty” Toleration to 
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998) [hereinafter Toleration]; LINDA C. MCCLAIN, 
THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006) [hereinafter 
PLACE OF FAMILIES]. 
9 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)).  
10 411 U.S. 113 (1973).  
11 Cass Sunstein, for example, has called Roe a “maximalist” decision and argued that it might have 
been better if the Court issued a more minimalist decision, striking down certain restrictions, but 
letting state legislatures deliberate about the abortion regulation issue.  CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE 
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 54-57 (1999).  See also MARY ANN 
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). 




on a continuum.”12  Values polarization, then, as political commentary and 
political science elaborate, connotes a move away from a continuum toward a 
clustering around two extremes.13  Since the 2004 presidential election, the vivid 
dichotomy, “red states/blue states,” has conjured this polarization.  In the recent 
presidential primary season, television commentators treated viewers to an array 
of blue, red, and even pink hues to demarcate how states – and even regions 
within states – divided votes among the various Democratic and Republican 
candidates. 
Terms like “value pluralism” or “conscientious moral disagreement” may 
not, it seems, capture the degree of disagreement implicit in “values 
polarization.”  In his recent book, Is Democracy Possible Here?, legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin notes the use of red and blue color maps by 
political commentators to signal a “deep, schismatic rift in the nation as a whole: 
a division between incompatible all-embracing cultures.”14  He starkly frames the 
problem as an abandonment of any effort to find common ground or shared terms 
of political argument: 
American politics are in an appalling state.  We disagree, fiercely, about 
almost everything.  We disagree about terror and security, social justice, 
religion in politics, who is fit to be a judge, and what democracy is.  These 
are not civil disagreements: each side has no respect for the other.  We are no 
longer partners in self-government; our politics are rather a form of war.15 
Dworkin resists, not surprisingly, the conclusion that common ground and 
principles are not possible.16  He proposes finding “shared principles of sufficient 
substance to make a national political debate possible and profitable” to find 
“common ground that makes genuine argument among people of mutual respect 
possible and healing.”17  His book flags an evident problem requiring solution: an 
apparent values polarization – a clash of cultures – with a detrimental impact on 
public life. 
A second apparent difference lies in the spatial conceptualization of the 
problem.  The issue is not simply the abstract proposition that reasonable people 
may hold different moral values.  Rather, the premise is that the states are divided 
based on their identification with different values.  People are “sorting” 
                                                                                                                         
 
12 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 909 (1987). 
13 William Galston addresses this in his article for this symposium, Political Polarization and the 
U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. REV. 307 (2008).  See also PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE 
AND THE PRESS, 2004 POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: EVENLY DIVIDED AND INCREASINGLY POLARIZED 
(2004) available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/196.pdf.  Compare MORRIS P. FIORINA ET 
AL., CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2004), with Alan Abramowitz & Kyle 
Saunders, Why Can't We All Just Get Along?  The Reality of a Polarized America, 3 THE FORUM 1 
(2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art1 (debate in the literature about 
whether there is polarization). 
14 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 2 (2006). 
15 Id. at 1. 
16 See id. at 6-7. 
17 Id. at 5, 6. 




themselves, both among and even within states, based on their values 
preferences.18  Moreover, in contrast to earlier debates over the proper role of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the scope of federal constitutional rights, today’s battles 
also focus on the role of state courts, state laws, and the interpretation of state 
constitutions (as is evident in the keen attention paid to decisions about same-sex 
marriage). 
A third distinction is that earlier debates over courts and moral 
disagreement often centered around the limits to a political majority’s use of the 
criminal law, while today’s controversies dividing “red” and “blue” states and 
voters extend to a broad range of law and policy issues, from the War on Terror 
to teaching “intelligent design” in public schools to defining parenthood and 
challenging restrictions on who may marry.  Undeniably, there is continuity: 
abortion and homosexuality, at the heart of many of the older debates, continue 
to be “wedge issues” – perhaps the most divisive issues – in today’s values 
polarization.19  At the same time, the change in the landscape for the basic civil 
rights of gay men and lesbians from 1986 (when Hardwick was decided) to 2008, 
when, first, the California Supreme Court, one of the most prestigious state 
courts, in In re Marriage Cases,20 and, then – since this symposium took place – 
Connecticut’s high court21 joined Massachusetts22 in ruling that state 
constitutional law required that civil marriage be opened to same-sex couples, is 
stunning.  Those rulings were paved in part by the Supreme Court’s striking 
down of Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas, even as they demonstrated the 
independent vitality of state constitutions as guarantors of individual rights.  
While Lawrence remains controversial to those who would support using the 
criminal law to shore up a norm of marital heterosexuality, the bigger issues 
today concern access by gay men and lesbians to the institution of civil marriage 
– or to alternative legal statuses, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships – 
and to the institution of parenthood.  In short, as the flurry of state ballot 
initiatives concerning marriage, parenthood, and abortion in the November 2008 
election (including Proposition 8, which blunted the California high court’s 
ruling) confirm, one battleground is family law.23 
                                                                                                                         
 
18 Galston, supra note 13, at 316-18. 
19 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 78-79, 86-89; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue 
Families 29 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 343, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008544.  
20 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385 (Cal. 2008).  
21 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  
22 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
23 California voters approved Proposition 8, which amended California’s constitution to define 
marriage as the union between one man and one woman – a definition previously approved by 
voters as a statutory matter in Proposition 22.  Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, 
California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122586056759900673.html.  Several legal challenges to the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8 are pending before the California Supreme Court.  Ashley Surdin, 
Legality of Same-Sex Marriage Ban Challenged, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at A2.  In other 
initiatives, Arizona and Florida voters passed bans on same-sex marriage and Arkansans passed a 




If, as Dworkin suggests, Americans disagree fiercely about everything, then 
that disagreement, as June Carbone, an architect of this symposium, and her co-
author Naomi Cahn suggest, is especially fierce about family issues.  Family 
issues – “moral values” issues – have been “particularly vulnerable” to the 
partisan tactics that foment values polarization because “the divisions over family 
values rest on genuine and deep-seated cultural anxieties.”24  Cahn and Carbone 
use the evocative slogan, “red families versus blue families,” to capture this basic 
division over family values.  They offer some intriguing hypotheses: “‘blue 
families’ and ‘red families’ are living different lives, with different moral 
imperatives.”25  What’s more, red states and blue states have “different family 
law regimes” that “rest on different paradigms” about the proper regulation of 
sexuality, marriage, and reproduction.26  Abortion and homosexuality (and the 
related question of whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry) 
remain the two most visible – and politically divisive – in this cluster of family 
values issues.  Other contested issues include governmental promotion of 
marriage, control of teen sexuality (and the best form of sex education), the law 
of divorce, formal versus functional definitions of family, and gender roles in the 
family.27  
Cahn and Carbone also contend that legal scholars put a “disproportionate 
emphasis on the federal courts and the constitutional order” when they examine 
battles over “moral values.”28  This obscures the extent to which these struggles 
are over divergent views of the moral terms of family life and, in turn, family 
law, as well as the constructive role that state court judges may play in these 
struggles.29  This contention by Cahn and Carbone makes for an apt contrast with 
Dworkin’s project.  For Dworkin seeks to move beyond red-blue polarization by 
putting forth shared principles of personal and political morality that may guide a 
national political discussion.30  In charting a path beyond values polarization, 
Cahn and Carbone stress the virtues of federalism and of different states 
articulating – through family law – different values.31  Dworkin emphasizes 
federal constitutional law and does not consider the import of his proposed 
shared principles for state family law, while Cahn and Carbone self-consciously 
put constitutional law to the side.  These contrasting approaches suggest the 
challenge of identifying common ground – whether in the form of principles or 
values – or of finding strategies to cope with apparently conflicting (or even 
                                                                                                                         
measure barring unmarried persons from adopting children.  South Dakota voters rejected a 
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24 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 58. 
25 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 1. 
26 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 1. 
27 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 1. 
28 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 UMKC LAW REVIEW 267, 271 (2008). 
29 Id. at 267-70. 
30 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
31 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 28, at 303-04. 




incommensurable) values that play out in legal struggles over intimate and family 
life and family law.32  
In this article, I will compare Dworkin’s and Cahn and Carbone’s 
interpretations of the values polarization problem.  Considering these two 
interpretive projects in tandem helps to illuminate the merits and limitations of 
each and bring out different aspects of the challenge posed by the question of the 
judicial role in an era of values polarization.  As a crucible through which to test 
these two interpretive projects and to examine the question of the judicial role, I 
will discuss In re Marriage Cases, in which the Supreme Court of California 
ruled that both the privacy and equal protection guarantees of its constitution 
require that civil marriage be opened up to include same-sex couples.33  As the 
subsequent success of Proposition 8 at the polls – blunting the Court’s ruling – 
and the current legal challenges to Proposition 8 before that same Court indicate, 
California also features an interesting interplay among institutional actors: the 
legislature, “the people” (through ballot initiatives), the executive (the governor), 
and the state and federal courts.34  Moreover, since California’s high court 
consistently ranks, in most studies,35 as the best or one of the best high courts, its 
judicial methods in addressing a “hot button” issue may be of particular interest.  
The pathways followed by California’s neighbors, Oregon and Washington, 
toward expansive domestic partnership laws are also instructive. 
In its epilogue, this article asks whether the November 2008 election of 
President Barack Obama, who resisted the red America-blue America dichotomy 
and argued for a return to “values we hold in common as Americans,”36 signals 
the beginning of the end of red-blue values polarization even in the fraught area 
of family life and family values. It concludes by noting the inevitable relevance 
of the consideration of values in developing and adjudicating family law. 
II.  THE RED AND THE BLUE: OF STATES, COMMUNITIES, 
FAMILIES, AND FAMILY LAW 
In this section, I will explicate and critically evaluate Dworkin and Cahn 
and Carbone’s contrasting interpretive projects.  Dworkin interprets the red 
state/blue state divide on abortion, same-sex marriage, and other contentious 
                                                                                                                         
 
32 Drawing on Dworkin’s earlier work on principles, symposium contributor Vivian Hamilton 
argues that family law reflects two foundational principles, Biblical traditionalism and liberal 
individualism, but that these are in an unproductive tension with each other and require revisiting. 
See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2006).  
33 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385, 451 (Cal. 2008).  
34 On the success of Prop. 8, see Audi et al, supra note 23. The California Supreme Court will hear 
oral arguments in the legal challenge to Proposition 8 on March 5, 2009. See Equality California, 
http://www.eqca.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
35 Stephen J. Choi et al., Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts? 7 (Univ. of Chicago 
Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 405 (2d Series), 2008), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/405.pdf. 
36 Barack Obama, Speech in Canton, Ohio (Oct. 27, 2008) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/politics/27text-obama.html. 




issues as resting on two contrasting models of the relationship between religion 
and politics, and of liberty, community, and democracy.  His strategy for 
showing how principled argument may be possible despite clashing views is to 
identify shared principles about human dignity and personal responsibility.  He 
offers concrete steps to improve democratic deliberation, but also affirms the role 
of courts in protecting minorities and these dignitary principles, making genuine 
democracy possible. 
Cahn and Carbone’s interpretive framework focuses on two contrasting 
family law regimes, which shape the lives of red and blue families.  Red states 
emphasize a “more traditional family system that celebrates marriage as the 
institution ordained to promote the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing.”37  
Blue states “have moved toward a “new family model,” which they term “the 
new middle class morality”: it involves “less control of sexuality, celebrates more 
egalitarian gender roles, and promotes financial independence and emotional 
maturity as the sine qua non of responsible parenthood.”38  In this symposium, 
Cahn and Carbone offer directives about how, “at a time when different parts of 
the country are experiencing cultural change at different speeds,” courts can play 
a mediating role in values conflicts and “solidify changing cultural 
understandings.”39  
A.  Dworkin: Human Dignity as a Shared Principle and Basis for Political 
Argument 
Dworkin’s aim in Is Democracy Possible Here? is to show that enough 
Americans on both sides of the “supposedly unbridgeable divide” between red 
and blue share two principles about “the value and the central responsibilities of 
a human life” that a national political debate is both “possible and profitable.”40  
Those two “abstract, indeed philosophical, principles”41 involve dimensions of 
human dignity.  The first is “the principle of intrinsic value”: “each human life 
has a special kind of objective value,” such that “once a human life has begun, it 
matters how it goes.  It is good when that life succeeds and its potential is 
realized and bad when it fails and its potential is wasted.”42  By “objective,” 
Dworkin means that it matters – or should matter – to everyone whether a life 
succeeds or is wasted, just as “we should all regret an injustice, wherever it 
occurs, as something bad in itself.”43 
                                                                                                                         
 
37 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 2. 
38 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 19, at 2. 
39 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 28 at 3. 
40 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 6-7. 
41 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
42 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 9. 
43 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 10.  Dworkin elaborates on the idea of intrinsic value and the 
sanctity of life as one such value in his attempt to explain – and find resolution of – the abortion 
debate.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Vintage Books 1993). 




“The second principle – the principle of personal responsibility – holds that 
each person has a special responsibility for realizing the success of his own life . . 
. .”44  This “personal responsibility for the governance” of one’s life includes 
making and executing “ultimate decisions about what life would be a good one to 
lead.”45  This second principle draws a line between coercion and manipulation, 
which are impermissible, and various permissible – indeed, inevitable – forms of 
influence.46  The latter include taking the advice of friends, the impact of “the 
culture in which we all live,” or deferring to the judgments of a particular 
religious text or religious (or secular) leader.47  Dworkin distinguishes these 
influences from the subordination that the second principle condemns: 
We may not subordinate ourselves to the will of other human beings in 
making those decisions; we must not accept the right of anyone else to force 
us to conform to a view of success that but for that coercion we would not 
choose.  We must be careful to distinguish subordination so defined from a 
variety of ways in which others may influence us that do not involve 
subordination and that this principle of dignity therefore does not condemn . . 
. . 
But granting government or any other group the authority to require our 
adherence to a particular scheme of values on pain of punishment, or to 
dictate marriage partners or professions or occupations to us, would indeed 
mean subordination.48 
If Dworkin succeeds in persuading his readers that most Americans (or at 
least a critical mass of them) share these two principles – that they are the 
“common property of Americans,” his second substantive project is to show how 
these principles bear on the host of politically divisive issues.49  The set of 
answers he derives are “a very deep shade of blue.”50  They constitute an 
intended positive program, “firmly based” on “common ground among 
Americans,” for what liberalism “means and requires now.”51  Dworkin, for 
example, supports a right of same-sex couples to marry52 and a woman’s right to 
choose abortion,53 sharply criticizes the disregarding of civil liberties and human 
                                                                                                                         
 
44 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 10. 
45 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17. 
46 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17. 
47 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 10, 17. 
48 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17-18.  I have elsewhere discussed the distinction between certain 
forms of persuasion and compulsion as consistent with an anti-compulsion rationale for toleration.  
See McClain, Toleration, supra note 8. 
49 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 7. 
50 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 7. 
51 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 7. 
52 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 87-89.  
53 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 79.  




rights in Bush’s War on Terror,54 and rejects teaching intelligent design as 
science.55  
Dworkin interprets the clash over “the fiercely galvanizing issues” of 
abortion and gay marriage as resting on “[t]he clash . . . over the role that religion 
should play in politics, religion, and public life.”56  Americans, he argues, “agree 
on one crucially important principle: our government must be tolerant of all 
peaceful religious faiths and also of people of no faith.”57  But they disagree over 
the “base” from which such tolerance should spring: should America be a 
religious nation tolerant of nonbelief or a secular nation that tolerates religion?58  
This disagreement turns on two contrary principles of political morality.  If 
America is a tolerant religious nation, this means that it may not establish any 
one discrete faith as the official state religion, but it may “openly acknowledge 
and support, as official state policy, religion as such; it declares religion to be an 
important positive force in making people and society better.”59  Such a nation 
“will accept only one reason for curtailing its rhetorical and financial support for 
religion – protecting the freedom of dissenters and nonbelievers”; it may declare 
“that nonbelievers are deeply mistaken.”60  A tolerant secular society, by 
contrast, “is collectively neutral on the subject of whether there is a god or gods 
or which religion is best, if any is.”61  Like a religious nation, it must be 
“permissive” about religion and not make peaceful exercise of religion illegal.62  
It would not discriminate against religious groups as providers of public services, 
but it would be “wary” of governmental programs that “particularly benefitted 
religious organizations.”63 
Dworkin concedes that there is support in history as well as among 
lawmakers and jurists for both models (particularly, the tolerant religious nation 
model), but argues “the principle of personal responsibility requires a tolerant 
secular state and rules out a tolerant religious state.”64  Here, Dworkin elaborates 
two contrasting models of the structure of liberty that flow from a tolerant 
religious and a tolerant secular view.  His starting definition is that “liberty is the 
right to do what you want with the resources that are rightfully yours.”65  By this, 
he means to acknowledge that government may restrict freedom for plausible 
distributive reasons, such as laws prohibiting damage to property or tax laws.66  
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55 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 80-84. 
56 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 54-55. 
57 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 56. 
58 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 56. 
59 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 58. 
60 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 58. 
61 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 58. 
62 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 58. 
63 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 59. 
64 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 66. 
65 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 69. 
66 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 69-70. 




People have “a right to choose and live their values only within the space allowed 
by proper distributional regulations and constraints of these different kinds.”67  
By contrast to distributive constraints, government should not restrict 
liberty for what he calls a personally judgmental justification, which “appeals to 
or presupposes a theory about what kinds of lives are intrinsically good or bad for 
the people who lead those lives.”68  Dworkin contrasts impersonally judgmental 
justifications “that appeal to the intrinsic value of some impersonal object or state 
of affairs rather than to the intrinsic value of certain kinds of lives.”69  
Environmental regulation that limits the freedom of timber companies to protect 
great forests, for example, “appeals to the impersonally judgmental justification 
that such forests are natural treasures;” another example is zoning laws whose 
purpose is to protect “architectural or historic integrity.”70 The distinctions 
between impersonally and personally judgmental justifications, Dworkin 
contends, is “crucial to liberty”: “We must distinguish between laws that violate 
dignity by usurping an individual’s responsibility for his own ethical values and 
those that exercise a community’s essential collective responsibility to identify 
and protect nonethical values.”71    
How does this distinction apply to legal regulations concerning 
homosexuality and to access to civil marriage?  “Any justification for making 
sodomy illegal that cites the immorality or baseness of that sexual practice is 
personally judgmental.”72  Here, Dworkin favorably quotes the “personhood” 
language articulated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and repeated in Lawrence 
v. Texas: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life;” beliefs 
about such matters – including matters of family and human relationships – 
“define the attributes of personhood.”73  
The right of gay men and lesbians to have access to the institution of 
marriage poses distributional as well as liberty questions.  Since marriage is a 
“social resource of irreplaceable value,” can unequal access to it be justified?74  
Dworkin argues no: opponents have attempted to offer various nonjudgmental 
justifications in litigation over this issue, but “have had to resort to thoroughly 
speculative hypotheses.”75  Specifically, the argument made in dissent in 
Goodridge that heterosexual marriage is a better environment for raising children 
is not supported by the evidence, “reflects a judgmental religious perspective,” 
and is “belied by the practice, in Massachusetts as well as other states, of 
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permitting unmarried same-sex couples to adopt children.”76  Dworkin suggests 
that “the case against gay marriage, put most sympathetically, comes to this”: 
[T]he institution of marriage is . . . a unique and immensely valuable cultural 
resource.  Its meaning and hence its value have accreted organically over 
centuries, and the assumption that marriage is the union of a man and a 
woman is so embedded in its meaning that it would become a different 
institution, and hence a less valuable institution, were that assumption now 
challenged and lost.  Just as we might struggle to maintain the meaning and 
value of any other great natural or artistic resource, so we should struggle to 
retain this uniquely valuable cultural resource.77 
Versions of this argument, in fact, have been made both in public debates about 
this issue and in litigation: to redefine marriage would alter the social meaning of 
marriage in ways that are harmful to the institution and to society.78 
Dworkin offers an interesting rejoinder, appealing to the personal 
responsibility that liberty protects: substitute the institution of religion for 
“marriage” in the above argument.79  You will see that, over time, religion’s 
meaning has changed through “organic processes,” such as the development of 
new religions as well as “new threats to established doctrine and practice” 
generated by secular theories of science, politics, or social justice.80  Moreover, 
“[p]eople’s sense of what religion is” has also been altered by many different 
social movements in the broader society (such as feminism), and by “a thousand 
other shifts in religious impulse that began in individual decision and ended in 
seismic changes in what religion can and does mean.”81  American religious 
conservatives, he argues, do not advocate freezing the cultural meaning of 
religion “by laws prohibiting people with new visions from access to the title, 
legal status, or tax and economic benefits of religious organization.”82  By 
contrast, the “cultural argument against gay marriage”83 mistakenly assumes that 
“the culture that shapes our values is the property only of some of us – those who 
happen to enjoy political power for the moment – to sculpt and protect in the 
shape we admire.”84  Instead, an understanding of liberty consistent with the 
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personal responsibility it protects insists that “in a genuinely free society, the 
world of ideas and values belongs to no one and to everyone.”85 
This account of liberty, he contends, is consistent with his proposed two 
principles of human dignity – that “everyone’s life is of equal intrinsic value and 
that everyone has the same personal responsibility for his life as I do.”86  
Dworkin contends that, by contrast, a tolerant religious nation “supposes a 
narrow conception of religious freedom that does not include, for instance, a right 
to choose abortion or to marry someone of the same sex.”87  The tolerant secular 
model has a broader conception of freedom that includes such rights to choose. 
Over the years, Dworkin’s account of the foundations of liberalism has 
consistently distinguished the ethical and the moral and advanced a particular 
argument about the right – and personal responsibility – of individuals to shape 
their ethical environment.88  First, he distinguishes the ethical and the moral: 
“[o]ur ethical convictions define what we should count as a good life for 
ourselves; our moral principles define our obligations and responsibilities to 
other people.”89  Principles of dignity assign each person a “personal 
responsibility” for ethical decisions.  Ethical values are “plainly implicated,” he 
argues, “in decisions about sexual conduct, marriage, and procreation.”90  Again, 
Dworkin points to the personhood formulations in Casey and Lawrence, 
observing that religious convictions, along with “people’s convictions about the 
role of love, intimacy, and sexuality in their lives,”91 fall into the ethical category, 
and, thus, dignity is violated when laws “usurp[] an individual’s responsibility 
for his [or her] own ethical values,”92 by contrast to laws that “exercise a 
community’s essential collective responsibility to identify and protect nonethical 
values.”93 
A related argument is that each individual has a right to shape the ethical 
environment through the decisions he or she makes, rather than having that 
environment controlled by a majority’s view of the best way to live.  As in 
Dworkin’s earlier work, Is Democracy Possible Here? presses an analogy 
between the economic and ethical environment.94  On the one hand, government 
properly regulates the market for reasons of “distributive fairness” and to protect 
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against various kinds of externalities.95  On the other, “Americans are unwilling 
to grant political majorities a parallel collective power over the fundamentals of 
our economic culture,” but rather, insist that “the economic culture be shaped by 
a vector of individual decisions reflecting individual values and wishes.”96  
After Bowers v. Hardwick, Dworkin contended that the Supreme Court’s 
decision was wrong for, among other reasons, its premise that the ethical 
environment must be shaped in a winner-take-all way based on supposed 
majority disapproval of homosexuality.97  Whatever common life a political 
community has, he argues, it does not extend to a “communal sex life.”98  For, “it 
is deeply implausible that the characterization of communal life that best fits such 
a community could be one that assumes that it must choose . . . one set of 
standards of sexual responsibility . . . .”99  To this argument, Dworkin added a 
classic liberal argument against coercion: a person’s life cannot be improved 
against the grain of his or her “most profound ethical convictions” that it has not 
been.100  The anti-coercion arguments recur in Is Democracy Possible Here?, 
where Dworkin affirms a principle of personal responsibility not to subordinate 
oneself to others dictating what makes for a good life for one to live.  As applied 
to a political community, persons’ personal responsibility for their own lives is 
“frustrated by allowing a majority of citizens to impose their values on everyone 
through legislation . . . .”101 
The role of courts receives comparatively little attention in Is Democracy 
Possible Here?, although Dworkin has addressed that topic extensively in other 
works.102  But the judicial role is relevant to his argument that the red-blue divide 
is evident in two competing conceptions of democracy: the majoritarian versus 
the partnership view.  In the first view, “democracy is government by majority 
will, that is, in accordance with the will of the greatest number of people, 
expressed in elections with universal or near universal suffrage.”103  The 
partnership view of democracy holds that “the people govern themselves each as 
a full partner in a collective political enterprise so that a majority’s decisions are 
democratic only when certain further conditions are met that protect the status 
and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that enterprise.”104  Majority 
support, just on its own, does not supply a “moral reason” for what the majority 
supports; ideas drawn from political morality about “justice, equality, and 
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liberty” should inform our views about what is a democratic decision.105  In this 
view a community is not democratic if it “steadily ignores the interests of some 
minority or other group.”106  Rights – and their protection by courts – play a 
crucial role in this partnership conception.  Because the U.S. Constitution 
provides a set of individual rights as “trumps over the majority’s power,”107 the 
United States is not a “pure example” of the majority view.108 
In a majoritarian model of democracy, the Court’s decisions about “school 
prayer, abortion, and homosexual rights” are undemocratic because they deny 
“the majority the right and power to make fundamental moral decisions for 
itself.”109  Liberals, by contrast, think “that the decisions that expanded individual 
rights enhanced rather than savaged our democracy;” “that view presupposes the 
partnership conception.”110  In effect, these “controversial constitutional 
decisions helped to ensure that the conditions” for full partnership are met, such 
that the majority is entitled to its will.111  
Principles of human dignity shape the place of individual rights and the role 
of courts in the partnership model of democracy.  As a consequence of the first 
principle of human dignity, a political community must show “equal concern” for 
all persons who live within its borders.112  One way to do so is by “embedding 
certain individual rights in a constitution that is to be interpreted by judges rather 
than by elected representatives, and then providing that the constitution can be 
amended only by supermajorities.”113  The second principle of human dignity 
leads to the requirement of self-government: “political arrangements must respect 
people’s personal responsibility for identifying value in their own lives.”114  
Here, Dworkin rejects the argument that because majority rule is self-
government, legislating out of concern for people’s interests is justified.115  Equal 
concern is a “necessary condition” for political legitimacy, but it cannot be a 
“sufficient” one, for people “have no moral right to assume coercive authority 
over others, even when they act in those other people’s interest.116  For Dworkin, 
the crucial issue is “what rights must be reserved to an individual citizen if 
submitting to the will of the majority of his fellow citizens in other circumstances 
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is to be consistent with his dignity.”117  Recall that, in Dworkin’s model, “[i]t is 
inconsistent with [a person’s] dignity ever to submit to the coercive authority of 
others in deciding what role religious or comparable ethical values should play in 
his life.”118  Thus, the partnership model “requires some guarantee that the 
majority will not impose its will in these matters.”119  Constitutional rights, by 
protecting an individual’s “freedom to make ethical choices for himself,” thus 
attempt to guarantee democracy, rather than to compromise it.120 
How useful are Dworkin’s two principles about human dignity for making 
progress on the issue of value polarization and the respective responsibilities of 
courts, legislatures, and the executive?  Does this philosophy of liberalism, with 
its distinction between ethics and morality and its insistence on personal 
responsibility for ethical decisions, offer a way beyond red-blue conflicts over 
“moral values”? Focused as it is on the role of federal constitutional rights and 
the Supreme Court, can it offer any useful tools for assessing what role state 
courts may constructively play in conflicts that often implicate family lives and 
state family law?  Does its distinction between personal judgmental and 
impersonal judgmental justifications have translation value in the arena of family 
law?  After all, even with the “moral transformation” of family law (or, the 
“demoralization” of family law), contemporary family law still retains important 
expressive, protective, facilitative, and channelling functions that, arguably, serve 
the interests of adults, children, and society as a whole.121  Where would family 
law’s various functions fit in this distinction?  To answer these questions, I will 
first look at the recent California Supreme Court decision, In re Marriage Cases, 
with an eye on Dworkin’s dignity principles.  I will then explicate Cahn and 
Carbone’s interpretive project about red and blue families. 
B.  The California Supreme Court’s In re Marriage Cases as a Test Case for 
Dworkin’s “Dignity” Principles and Partnership Model of Democracy  
California’s recent legalization of marriage by same-sex couples (albeit 
brought to at least a temporary halt by Proposition 8) is an interesting test case 
for assessing Dworkin’s appeal to principles of human dignity as a way to find 
common ground and, as I will later discuss, Cahn and Carbone’s idea of the clash 
between models of family law.  First, it is helpful to situate the case in the 
broader landscape of high court rulings on challenges brought by same-sex 
couples to state marriage laws.  In In re Marriage Cases, the California Supreme 
Court noted how the challenge to California’s marriage laws differed from 
challenges in other states because of the major strides already taken in California 
                                                                                                                         
 
117 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 146. 
118 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 146. 
119 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 146. 
120 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 146. 
121 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985) [hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse]; Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channelling Function of Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1992) [hereinafter 
Schneider, Channelling Function]; McClain, supra note 78, at 2151-55. 




toward marriage equality for gay men and lesbians – strides due to shifts in 
family law, evidenced in case law and legislation, and due to prior interpretations 
of constitutional law.122  The legislature enacted a domestic partnership law that 
evolved to provide virtually all of the benefits and obligations of civil marriage to 
same-sex couples, including those pertaining to “parental rights and 
responsibilities.”123  Subsequently, the legislature twice attempted to open up 
marriage to same-sex couples, but California’s governor vetoed the laws in light 
of Proposition 22, a successful ballot initiative that defined marriage as between 
one man and one woman, leaving it for the state court to decide.  This domestic 
partnership law, as well as prior judicial rulings and legislation concerning the 
parental rights and obligations of partners in same-sex relationships, facilitated 
pathways to reproduction and parenthood other than through heterosexual sex 
within marriage.  The remaining question was whether affording this alternative 
legal status, but not civil marriage, could withstand California’s constitutional 
guarantees of privacy and equal protection.124  The court concluded it could 
not.125 
Dworkin’s two principles about human dignity, recall, are that it matters 
that each human life goes well and not be wasted, and that each person has a 
personal responsibility to determine how to live his or her life and not to have 
others coercively decide such matters.126  Dworkin also speaks of marriage as a 
unique social resource.127  In both these respects, his analysis fits well with 
California’s high court opinion.  A conception of equal dignity and respect owed 
– as a matter of state constitutional law – to gay men and lesbians and the 
families they form was central to the California Supreme Court’s analysis.128  
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The court joined Massachusetts in believing that the name “marriage” – or at 
least the withholding of the name – means something.  According to the majority 
opinion, the right to marry as protected by the state constitution is a “couple’s 
right to have their family relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that 
accorded other officially recognized families.”129  The majority repeatedly refers 
to equal dignity and respect to explain what is at stake in the right to marry.130  
Calling a legally recognized relationship by a different name, depending on 
whom it involves, undermines equal dignity and respect.  Perhaps the state could, 
the majority suggests, strip all unions of the name “marriage” and call them 
something else, but as a matter of both due process and equal protection, it 
cannot maintain one status for heterosexual couples and another for homosexual 
couples.131  This argument also seems to fit Dworkin’s premise that the “status of 
marriage” provides a “social resource of irreplaceable value to those to whom it 
is offered.”132  What does he mean by this? As a social institution, marriage is “a 
distinct mode of association and commitment that carries centuries and volumes 
of social and personal meaning,” such that it is not possible to create an 
“alternate mode of commitment carrying a parallel intensity of meaning.”133  It is 
unjustified discrimination, he argues, to deny homosexual couples access to that 
“wonderful resource.”134 
The court emphasized the “core” right of all individuals to have their family 
relationship accorded “equal dignity and respect.”135  The denial of this dignity 
by exclusion from marriage is intertwined with the denial of access to marriage 
as a resource.  In addition to marriage’s symbolic importance, the court noted 
other reasons that allowing opposite-sex couples to marry, while relegating same-
sex couples to domestic partnerships, carried a serious risk of denying them such 
respect.136  The long history of disparaging gay men and lesbians and their 
intimate relationships warrants concern that a separate status will carry a lesser 
dignity.  The court also noted the practical problem, evident from Vermont’s and 
New Jersey’s experiences with civil unions, that the public understands marriage 
but does not understand domestic partnerships.137  This leads to differential 
treatment and discrimination such that these alternative legal statuses fail to 
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afford same-sex couples and their children the hoped-for equality.138  Finally, the 
court noted the risk that having separate tracks for opposite-sex and same-sex 
relationships may send a more general message that government regards gay men 
and lesbians and their families as less worthy of respect.139  
Thus, the court’s analysis seems consistent with Dworkin’s analysis of an 
individual’s access to resources – in this case, a social institution rich in meaning 
– as part of the exercise of personal responsibility.  Many same-sex couples 
understandably aspire to speak the “common language” of marriage.  Marriage 
signifies a well-defined and well-understood social relationship, one that does not 
need individual explanation or justification.  Whether or not it should, the status 
of “marriage” commands a unique public respect and esteem, which is why 
Dworkin and the California court argue that equalizing access to that status is a 
necessary component of equality.  Consigning certain couples to a different status 
based solely on their identity raises concerns about second-class citizenship.  The 
importance of the name is illustrated most effectively by the desire to withhold it 
from same-sex couples.140  
The distinctiveness of the California court’s approach is manifest from a 
comparison with that of New Jersey’s.  There, the state’s highest court said the 
naming question does not implicate constitutional questions, but is, instead, best 
resolved in the “crucible of the democratic process.”141  The majority concluded 
that constitutionally requiring access to “marriage” would force “social 
acceptance” upon the citizens of New Jersey, who may not be ready for it.142  
Any change in the longstanding definition of marriage, the majority believed, 
ought to come from the legislature, through “civil dialogue and reasoned 
discourse.”143 
The California court rejects this approach, which seems to stem more from 
considerations of policy than constitutional reasoning.  The California court 
makes this point emphatically with its frequent statements that its role is not to 
make decisions based on public policy or what is popular but to interpret the 
constitution.144  It cites to its own precedent, Perez v. Sharp,145 which struck 
down California’s ban on interracial marriage in 1948, noting that although it 
was “rendered by a deeply divided court,” it is “a judicial opinion whose 
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legitimacy and constitutional soundness are by now universally recognized.”146  
The California court’s opinion also seems consistent with Dworkin’s partnership 
model of democracy.  Majority rule is not sufficient, on this view.  In order to be 
full partners, the minority needs to be protected by certain rights so that a 
majority does not have the power to dictate to a minority how to decide ethical 
values.  Who to marry, on Dworkin’s view, would fall within this range of ethical 
decisions, and yet, it also implicates questions of political morality, for marriage 
implicates not just freedom from governmental interference but also freedom to 
affirmative governmental recognition and support, a distributive matter.147  
A partnership model of democracy is also evident in the court’s rejection of 
the argument that it is precluded either by the will of “the people” expressed 
through the ballot initiative or by the doctrine of separation of powers from 
modifying the traditional definition of marriage.148  The court retorts that while it 
would violate separation of powers if it redefined marriage based on its view of 
public policy or the public interest, a court “has an obligation to enforce the 
limitations that the California Constitution imposes upon legislative measures” 
and it owes a responsibility to each member of the public to do so.149  Similarly, 
the fact that the limitation of marriage to one man and one woman was enacted as 
a ballot initiative rather than as a simple legislative enactment is “irrelevant,” 
because (here quoting former Chief Justice Burger): “the voters may no more 
violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may 
do so by enacting legislation.”150  The argument that the initiative represents the 
“people’s will” misses “the very basic point” that: 
the provisions of the California Constitution itself constitute the ultimate 
expression of the people’s will, and that the fundamental rights embodied 
within that Constitution for the protection of all persons represent restraints 
that the people themselves have imposed upon the statutory enactments that 
may be adopted either by their elected representatives or by the voters 
through the initiative process.  As the United States Supreme Court explained 
in Board of Education v. Barnette . . . “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights 
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”151 
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Exactly so, Dworkin would no doubt say, adding that what characterizes these 
various decisions is that they – along with the right to marry – fall within what he 
calls the realm of the ethical.152  
The California Supreme Court’s invocation of this classic language from 
Barnette about the vital countermajoritian role of rights suggests that certain 
contemporary battles over family law are unavoidably also about constitutional 
law.  This reflects the often-noted “constitutionalization” of family law in recent 
decades, that is, the transformative impact of both federal and state constitutions 
on family law.153  I also mean that contemporary debates over family formation 
and family definition seem inevitably to implicate basic constitutional guarantees 
of liberty and equality.  The evolving interpretation of these guarantees has come 
to shape contemporary family law in ways that challenge a simple appeal to 
“historical” tradition.  Thus, responding to the State’s appeal both to the 
historical tradition of marriage as between one man and one woman as well as to 
the fact that the “overwhelming majority” of jurisdictions in the U.S. and around 
the world continue to hold to this understanding, the court counters: 
if we have learned anything from the significant evolution in the prevailing 
societal views and official policies toward members of minority races and 
toward women over the past half-century, it is that even the most familiar and 
generally accepted of social practices and traditions often mask an unfairness 
and inequality that frequently is not recognized or appreciated by those not 
directly harmed by those practices or traditions.154   
The court points to well-established but now constitutionally discredited legal 
rules against interracial marriage, the exclusion of women from occupations and 
official duties, and separate and assertedly “equivalent” public facilities and 
institutions for racial minorities.155 
 What is the vantage point that affords critical perspective on these 
practices?  Here, the court turns to Lawrence v. Texas:  
the expansive and protective provisions of our constitutions, such as the due 
process clause, were drafted with the knowledge that “times can blind us to 
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary 
and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”  For this reason, the interest in 
retaining a tradition that excludes a historically disfavored minority group 
from a status that is extended to all others – even when the tradition is long-
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standing and widely shared – does not necessarily represent a compelling 
state interest for purposes of equal protection analysis.156 
The court goes on to find that the state could offer no compelling interests 
for retaining this definition.157  To use Dworkin’s terminology, we could say that 
it did not find any impersonally judgmental justifications for excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage.158  The appeal to optimal childrearing, proffered by the 
Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund and the Campaign for California Families, 
did not suffice as a justification because California’s statutory laws “permit 
same-sex couples to adopt and raise children” and draw no distinction between 
married and domestic partners with respect to “legal rights and responsibilities 
relating to children raised within each of [those] family relationships.”159  The 
court also concluded that preserving the traditional definition was not necessary 
to “preserve the rights and benefits of marriage currently enjoyed by opposite-sex 
couples,” while “the exclusion of same-sex couples from the designation of 
marriage works a real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their 
children.”160  
In sum, there is a reasonably good fit between Dworkin’s principles of 
dignity and the California Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutional problems 
with California’s marriage laws.  Arguably, California’s constitutional 
commitment to equal protection and its evolving statutory protection against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are compatible with an idea of 
the dignity of each human life.  So too is the evolution of common law and 
statutory law in the direction of facilitating the intimate relationships of and 
parenting by gay men and lesbians, and the court’s ruling that opening up the 
institution of civil marriage itself was necessary to satisfy the requirement of 
equal dignity and respect.  Access to the unique social resource of civil marriage, 
in turn, fosters the capacity of each individual to take responsibility for his or her 
own conception of a good life, including the place of marriage and family in it.161  
Denying access to this resource might be viewed, in Dworkin’s framework, as 
violating the rule that this personal responsibility is not satisfied when the state or 
majorities preclude a person from deciding for him or herself.  The appeal to 
“dignity” featured, of course, in Lawrence and also in Goodridge.162  It has been 
important in constitutional jurisprudence about expanding definitions of family 
and of marriage in Canada as well as in South Africa, where the constitution 
contains a right to dignity.163  
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Would Dworkin’s principles of dignity be equally helpful in considering 
some other areas of red-blue contention?  What about another other wedge issue: 
abortion?  Resolving the abortion issue in this way presents a formidable 
challenge.  “Dignity” has featured in U.S. Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence 
both as a ground (in Casey) for supporting women’s abortion rights as well as (in 
Gonzales v. Carhart) for prohibiting a method of late-term abortion.164  As 
Dworkin has previously discussed, people on both sides of the issue may share a 
belief in the sanctity of human life – that it matters that a life begun in earnest 
should not be wasted,165 but for opponents of legal abortion, this conviction 
demands prohibiting, not permitting abortion.  Recent scholarship and 
commentary on the abortion issue stresses that the battle over abortion rights is, 
to a significant degree, a battle over visions of family and of women’s proper 
roles.166  This is evident from the Carhart majority’s apparent acceptance of the 
argument that abortion decisions harm women, who require protection by a 
complete ban on certain procedures.167  
Dworkin’s premise is that if we recognize our shared principles, then we 
can see that our intense disagreements stem from conflicts about the best 
interpretation of such principles.  The same-sex marriage and abortion issues – 
and many other issues on which red-state v. blue-state divide – implicate 
conflicting visions of family, gender roles, and the proper ordering of sexuality, 
reproduction, and parenthood.  These conflicting visions may also, to use 
Dworkin’s framework, rest on sharply different views of what personal 
responsibility requires, and it might be fruitful to examine those views.  But 
another plausible diagnosis of these conflicts is that, as Vivian Hamilton argues, 
family law rests upon conflicting fundamental principles, not just the liberal 
individualism (akin to Dworkin’s own liberal principles) reflected in a 
commitment to individual autonomy, liberty, and equality, freedom of contract, 
and governmental protection of the individual, but also in Biblical traditionalism, 
with its emphasis on conjugality, that is, the “natural,” marital, procreative 
family, and on a proper gender ordering within the family.168  As I have 
elaborated in other work, this conjugal view of marriage and the natural family 
shapes opposition to extending marriage to same-sex couples as well as to 
egalitarian models of marriage that deemphasize gender roles. 169  It is challenged 
by social trends that depart from the love-marriage-baby carriage sequence.  As 
Reva Siegel details, a religious view of the “natural” family and women’s proper 
maternal role also shapes the “woman protective” abortion argument that 
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surfaced in Carhart as well as opposition to contraception and comprehensive 
sex education.170  Dworkin’s goal of identifying common principles that make a 
national conversation possible is attractive, but it may need to reckon with the 
possibility that differences on these matters rest on sharply clashing principles.    
One limitation of Dworkin’s theory is that it focuses primarily on the 
individual.  It speaks of marriage as a unique resource and a social institution, but 
it does not probe the meaning of social institutions or the premise that marriage 
has both personal/private and public dimensions – evident in Goodridge’s 
assertion that the state is a third party to every marriage.171  Dworkin’s project 
does not centrally engage with the family as a social institution, with regulation 
of the family, or with competing visions of family at stake in the red/blue divide.  
To test the adequacy of Dworkin’s interpretive project would require considering 
whether and how it could address those issues.  How, for example, might his 
distinction between impermissible subordination and permissible influence apply 
to the various forms of education, persuasion, and incentives that government 
uses – or has sought to use – to influence people’s ideas and behaviors 
concerning sexuality and family formation?172  Because of their eschewal of 
common – as it were, national – principles in favor of a diagnosis of sharply 
diverging sets of values, tied to subnational units, and their explicit focus on the 
family and family law, Cahn and Carbone’s project provides a useful contrast. 
C.  Cahn and Carbone: The Traditional Family System v. the New Family 
Model – What Should or Can Courts Do in a Time of Transition? 
 In a series of writings, Naomi Cahn and June Carbone are developing the 
intriguing thesis that the division between red states and blue states reflects a 
division between the different lives families are living in red and blue states, 
shaped by the contrasting family law regimes produced in those states.  Values 
polarization often centers on “moral values” concerning family.173  Moral 
disagreement is exacerbated by the “partisanship” that “is an increasingly salient 
fact of American political life”: political activists use “‘wedge’ issues to energize 
their core supporters, and divide an electorate that most polls show has 
overwhelmingly moderate and stable political views.”174  Family values issues 
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lend themselves to such polarization because they reflect real anxieties and 
cultural differences.175 
Cahn and Carbone’s premise is that “red states” still emphasize a “more 
traditional family system that celebrates marriage as the institution ordained to 
promote the unity of sex, procreation, and childrearing.”176  Control of sexuality 
is at a premium, and thus, pre-marital sexual activity is strongly discouraged; 
relatively early marriage and parenthood are encouraged.177  They further 
contend that this model regards “socialization into traditional gender roles” as 
“critical to marital stability.”178  For red states, abortion is “an abomination” 
because it violates religious teachings and because it signifies sex without 
responsibility.179  Gay marriage is “the symbol of the ability to flout moral 
teachings in the name of individualism and choice.”180  The family law of red 
states tends to embrace more fully the traditional role of family law in 
“channelling” human sexuality (that is, heterosexuality) into the social institution 
of marriage as the best place for reproduction and parenthood.181 
Blue states evince what Cahn and Carbone call “the new middle class 
morality,” which “responds to the post-industrial economy by delaying 
childbearing and investing in the educational and workplace opportunities of both 
men and women.”182  People in these states generally have higher average levels 
of education and marry and have children at later ages than those in red states, 
where early marriage (including the shotgun wedding) is a way to manage the 
onset of sexual activity.  This model 
involves less control of sexuality, celebrates more egalitarian gender roles, 
and promotes financial independence and emotional maturity as the sine qua 
non of responsible parenthood. . . . In this model, abstinence is unrealistic, 
contraception is not only permissible, but morally compelled, and abortion is 
the necessary (and responsible) fallback.  Nonmarital cohabitation is 
irrelevant to child custody determinations absent an immediate impact on the 
child, but domestic violence is a serious threat to family integrity that 
requires state intervention.  Recognition of same-sex relationships is a matter 
of basic equality.183 
In other words, blue states do not lack “family values.”  Their family model 
reflects a particular idea about personal responsibility and how to exercise that to 
secure a good life. 
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Cahn and Carbone acknowledge that each state, whether characterized as 
red or blue, has diversity within it and that a number of states are better viewed 
as purple.184  Thus, their framing device is not meant as an exact or accurate 
picture of actual family lives in America.  Rather, it is a rhetorical strategy that 
helps them advance an argument about the up-to-now neglected role of family 
law in shaping red and blue states and, more generally, the “role of family law 
within a federal system at a time of cultural conflict.”185  
 Considering the strong association of red state voters as “values voters” in 
the 2004 election, and the implicit critique of blue state voters as lacking or not 
caring about “family values,” some of the data that Cahn and Carbone present 
about the actual patterns of family life in red and blue states are incongruous.  
Red states, for example, “have the highest divorce rates in the country,” as well 
as higher rates of teen pregnancy and teen birth, albeit the “lowest abortion 
rates.”186  Blue states have lower divorce rates, lower teen pregnancy and teen 
birth rates, and higher abortion rates. 
It is tempting to address these incongruities, or cultural contradictions, by 
recourse to sociologist W. Bradford Wilcox’s notion of families “walking right, 
talking left,” and vice versa.187  Red state families reportedly evince strong 
concern over family values, and yet their family life patterns seem to contradict 
such commitments (for example, the high divorce rates).  By contrast, blue state 
families, associated with more liberal views, seem to achieve more marital 
stability.  Ironically, religious convictions about the proper ordering of sexuality 
may play a part: early marriage is a strategy that makes sense given a religious 
world-view that condemns premarital sexual activity, but it is also a risk factor 
for divorce.188  Wilcox and others have looked at various economic and cultural 
factors, religion aside, that may explain these apparent incongruities.189  Wilcox 
suggests that even though premarital sex itself violates conservative religious 
views, “red state teens tend to hail from less-educated, working-class homes 
where childbearing at an early age is not a big deal and a long-term orientation to 
life is in short supply.”190  Thus, “if they give in to their passions” with someone 
they view as a “potential marital partner . . . they don’t have [that] much to 
lose.”191  (There is a remarkable parallel here to studies of poor teen mothers, and 
how early parenthood may be attractive based on their assessment of their 
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futures; hence the slogan, “the best contraceptive is a real future.”192)  When 
Frank Keating, then governor of Oklahoma, sought to address Oklahoma’s high 
divorce rate, which was linked to the state’s poverty level, he found that teen 
marriages were a contributing factor: people “just are not financially secure, 
emotionally secure, or educationally secure before they take that step into a 
lifetime commitment.”193  He noted a “southern culture challenge” of early 
marriage and articulated a goal of getting young people to wait until they are 
prepared for marriage.194 
What is intriguing about these sociological explanations is that they suggest 
that these patterns are not adaptive, whether measured from the perspective of the 
traditional family model of red states or the emerging “new middle class 
morality” model of blue states.  Cahn and Carbone’s basic argument is that 
investment in one’s human capital and delaying parenting is a formula for better 
relationship stability and more responsible parenting.195  Governor Keating, at 
least, would seem to agree.  During the 2008 presidential election campaign, the 
nonmarital pregnancy of Governor Sarah Palin’s daughter Bristol – followed by 
the announcement that Bristol would marry the father-to-be – riveted attention on 
the seeming gap between red state family values and red state family lives.  
Wilcox commented that one reason for Governor Palin’s popularity among 
evangelical and conservative voters was that the failings of her own family 
mirrored their own.  But this shortfall, he argues, fortifies religious conservatives 
in their conviction that law and policy should better support their family 
values.196  
One issue of great concern, as these two family models diverge, is growing 
family-based inequality.197  As Carbone argues, for “the new elite,” who follow 
the model of investment in human capital and postponed parenthood, “the picture 
of family life is a rosy one – two active parents with more income and time to 
invest in their children.”198  But the picture for poorer Americans is bleaker: they 
“disproportionately lack access to the new, approved pathways to adulthood,” as 
social supports for the more traditional model of family have atrophied.199  
Recent studies indicate that early marriage itself “continues to occur 
predominantly among young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds,” 
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particularly in rural and southern areas. 200  Such disadvantage contributes to 
further inequality: Carbone contends that early marriage and childbearing are 
primary forces driving emerging family-based inequality.201  
What, then, should the role of courts be in the face of these clashing models 
in red and blue states and these problems with family life?  The issue, Cahn and 
Carbone contend, is not whether or not courts should promote values: family law 
inevitably expresses values.  It also “has become a situs for fundamental moral 
change.”202  The issue is “how to decide which values to promote, and how to 
make that choice in a time of polarization.”203  “Courts, in their day-to-day 
decision-making on intimate family matters, often act as midwives guiding the 
birth of new values,” but lead effectively only if they take a “consensus-building, 
non-partisan stance.”204  While Cahn and Carbone doubt such leadership is 
possible on abortion, given the divisiveness on this issue, they offer some 
possible judicial strategies for values assertion.  
One suggestion with some resonance to Dworkin’s second dignitary 
principle is that courts should “police the distinction between the expression of 
shared values and the imposition of state control on those who dissent.”205  Here, 
they find the right balance struck in Lawrence: the Court struck down the use of 
criminal law against same-sex sodomy (“recognizing the value of same-sex 
intimacy”), but did not directly challenge “the expression of contrary values” (I 
assume they mean that it took no stand on the issue of access to marriage).206  
Similarly, guarding against “wholesale prohibition” (such as with abortion and 
contraception) can facilitate “avenues of family evolution.”207  They also seem 
attracted to judicial minimalism as a way of diffusing “hot button issues.”208  
Thus, interstate recognition of same-sex adoption and parentage seems “less 
direct and confrontational” than interstate recognition of same-sex marriage.209 
Ultimately, Cahn and Carbone argue that courts “should seize opportunities 
to crystallize a moral shift capable of commanding broad acceptance.”  Courts 
can mediate values by “expressing the common ground underlying seeming 
conflicts.”210  “[C]ase-by-case decision-making that can be tailored to the facts at 
hand is often less divisive than broader pronouncements of legislation or 
morality.”211  While they seem to harbor the normative aspiration that all states 
evolve toward the blue state model, they also seem to recognize that various 
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states’s family law – and family values – will inevitable diverge.  Thus, they 
suggest that, on certain issues, such as the relevance of nonmarital cohabitation to 
custody, “northeastern [blue] states would provide leadership . . . because these 
states have moved toward a model of deferred family formation.”212  But they 
also assert that one of the virtues of “family law federalism” is that different 
regions can express different values and, given deep divisions over values, “the 
expression of values may be best undertaken within smaller political units with 
greater sensitivity to regional variation.”213  Absent from their discussion is the 
important consideration about how federal – as well as state – constitutional 
commitments will shape or constrain this expression of values.  
D.  Assessing Cahn and Carbone’s Two Models: the Channeling Function 
and the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy 
I find Cahn and Carbone’s interpretive project particularly helpful in 
highlighting how the channelling function of family law is one issue that divides 
red and blue states.  Red states, they contend, are more likely to press a unitive, 
or conjugal, model of sex-marriage-reproduction, that is, a view of the proper 
ordering of sexuality and reproduction captured in the sequence of love-
marriage-baby carriage.214  Blue states are more receptive to functional 
definitions of family and to non-marital pathways to family formation and to 
parenthood.215  At the same time, I believe that the unitive model and the 
channelling function holds sway in blue states to a greater extent than they 
recognize, even as courts may transform their understandings of these ideas.  To 
illustrate both the explanatory power and the limits of their models, I will take up 
one of their examples: how states have sorted out on the issue of whether same-
sex couples may marry.  I will focus in particular on the puzzle that a number of 
blue states have reaffirmed marriage as the union between one man and one 
woman, and yet established alternative legal statuses for same-sex couples.  I will 
then take another look at the California Supreme Court’s decision, In Re 
Marriage Cases, focusing on the opinion’s discussion of the channelling function 
of family law.216  
Almost all of the red states have enacted “defense of marriage” laws 
(“DOMA”) either by statute or constitutional amendment.  No red state has 
adopted a new legal status affording same-sex couples the incidents of marriage.  
By contrast, Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut, all blue states, now 
allow (or, in the case of California, did allow) same-sex couples to marry.217  
Several other blue states in the northeast have enacted civil union laws, and 
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Oregon and Washington have domestic partnership laws.218  Relatively fewer 
blue states than red ones have enacted DOMAs, whether by statute or 
constitutional amendment.  Cahn and Carbone interpret these differences as 
evidence that the red states retain a strong commitment to the unitive view of 
marriage and to the premise that family law properly channels men and women 
into marriage to give order to sexuality, procreation, and parenthood.  Blue states 
have a different view: “Marriage is no longer associated with hierarchical 
authority or the gendered assignment of family roles, and instead becomes a 
matter of choice designed to express love and commitment . . . . Recognition of 
same-sex relationships becomes a matter of basic equality.”219 
There are a few problems with this interpretive model.  First, to date, only 
three blue states, Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut, have extended their 
civil marriage laws to allow such marriages.  In Massachusetts, as is by now 
familiar, this was as a result of a successful constitutional challenge brought by 
several couples in the state court, culminating in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public 
Health.220  Until recently, California had a law (adopted pursuant to ballot 
initiative) limiting marriage to one man and one woman,221 but also had a 
domestic partnership law that had evolved, by various legislative amendments, to 
offer same-sex couples and senior heterosexual couples nearly all of the benefits 
and obligations of marriage available under state law.  The legislature, twice, 
attempted to enact a law that would open civil marriage up to gay men and 
lesbians, but the governor (twice) vetoed it because of the ballot initiative, saying 
that it was up to California’s high court to determine whether the ballot initiative 
barred such a law or whether the initiative was unconstitutional.222  The Supreme 
Court of California recently ruled that, indeed, the legislature could not properly 
pass a law opening up civil marriage to same-sex couples without submitting it to 
voters for approval, but, in any case, the ballot initiative itself was 
unconstitutional because California’s guarantees of privacy and equal protection 
required that same-sex couples be allowed to marry.223 The voters, by passing 
Proposition 8, subsequently blunted the Court’s ruling with a constitutional 
amendment. 
As I will discuss below, the California Supreme Court considered 
channelling arguments and, while it rejected these, it by no means rejected all 
aspects of the traditional model of marriage.  Rather, it appropriated them by 
showing how, even taking them on their own terms, they supported extending the 
right to marry to same-sex couples.  By contrast to California, channelling 
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arguments about the traditional purposes of marriage have been successful in 
rebuffing constitutional challenges brought in other “blue” state courts, for 
example, in New York’s high court224 and in the appellate court in New Jersey.225 
If the cultural meaning of marriage has changed, why are some blue state 
courts receptive to the channelling argument?  Why do constitutional challenges 
appealing to basic equality and an evolving conception of marriage fail?  When 
constitutional challenges succeed, why are courts and legislatures in blue states 
(other than California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts) so reluctant to require 
that the proper remedy for same-sex couples seeking access to civil marriage is 
access is marriage itself, rather than an alternative status?  The wording of 
various civil union statutes is illustrative.  Legislatures seek both to affirm and 
preserve important traditions (including religious traditions) about the definition 
of marriage (namely, that it is between a man and a woman) even as they seek to 
honor a commitment to anti-discrimination and to valuing all families.226  This 
evinces a stance that there is something uniquely heterosexual about marriage: 
what is it, if not some form of argument about marriage’s unitive role, even if 
just reflecting the fact that marriage has been “about” uniting men and women?  
Simply appealing to “tradition” about what marriage has been does not tell us 
why that tradition should be continued. 
These alternative legal statuses may well represent a political compromise 
and reflect a way to reconcile divergent opinions and avoid divisive battles.  This 
in itself indicates red and blue divisions within some “blue” states and resistance 
to the premise that access to marriage by same-sex couples is a matter of basic 
equality.  It is hard to deny that Goodridge, in which Massachusetts’s high court 
subsequently ruled that civil unions were not an adequate remedy, sparked more 
national outcry than Baker,227 where the Vermont court left the question of the 
remedy to the legislature.  At the same time, it is interesting that the predicted 
overturning of Goodridge because of imagined popular uproar and “unnecessary 
political backlash”228 has not occurred.  Several attempts to use the legislative 
process to reverse the court’s ruling have failed.229  Of course, the fact that these 
attempts continue suggests at least some discontented “red” folks within 
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Massachusetts, as well as, most likely, considerable help by activists outside of 
the state concerned to overturn Goodridge.  By contrast, in California, opponents 
of the Court’s ruling swiftly mobilized and, with the aid of enormous amounts of 
money and effort by out-of-state organizations (including the Mormon church), 
passed Proposition 8.230 
These contrasting examples of Massachusetts and California may be 
attributable in part to the more arduous and lengthy process required in 
Massachusetts to amend the state constitution; but one common feature is intense 
out-of-state interest, both by opponents and supporters of expanding civil 
marriage. Further, recent developments in Massachusetts make its experiment in 
living more exportable.  Massachusetts has abolished its 1913 evasionary 
marriage law, which former Governor Romney successfully invoked to avoid 
out-of-state couples being able to come to Massachusetts to enter into a civil 
marriage that would not be allowed in their home state.231  Interestingly, one 
reported reason for this step was the prod of California’s opening its doors to out-
of-state same sex couples and the prospect of losing out on the “multimillion-
dollar benefit in weddings and tourism, especially from people who live in New 
York”!232  Meanwhile in New York, even though its high court has ruled that 
extending marriage to same-sex couples is not constitutionally required, the 
executive has called for recognition of such marriages.  Governor David 
Paterson, who supports enacting a law to allow same-sex couples to marry, 
issued an Executive Directive that all New York administrative agencies should 
afford comity or full faith and credit “to same-sex marriages that are legally 
performed in other jurisdictions,” lest they face liability. In rejecting a taxpayer 
challenge to this order, a trial court judge described the Governor’s order as “an 
incremental but important step toward equality long denied, even if, according to 
the New York Court of Appeals [Hernandez], full equality is not constitutionally 
mandated.” 233  (Will these developments spur the New York legislature to act to 
allow its same-sex couples to marry and keep those dollars at home?) 
Suggestive of Cahn and Carbone’s acknowledgment that states, in reality, 
may be more purple than blue or red are the examples of Oregon and 
Washington.  Cahn and Carbone’s framework of a unitive versus commitment 
model of marriage, however, is not adequate to the task of explaining the curious 
coexistence in these states of defense of marriage laws with expansive (or soon-
to-be-expanding) domestic partnership laws.  On the one hand, Oregon voters 
amended the constitution to bar same-sex marriage and affirm that marriage is 
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between one man and one woman.234  On the other, the legislature recently 
adopted an expansive domestic partnership law, extending to same-sex couples 
most of the benefits and obligations of marriage, including those relating to 
parenthood; an effort to subject it to a voter referendum was unsuccessful.235  The 
legislative findings show the legislature’s delicate dance as it acknowledges its 
state’s constitutional restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples, and yet 
declares that it properly may do what it can to recognize and protect the families 
formed by same-sex couples.236  At a minimum, we can conclude from this 
example that Oregonians wish to preserve marriage as a special status for one 
man and one woman, but also recognize that “family” today is not confined only 
to the marital form.  
Oregon’s neighbor, Washington, also invites examination of what values 
are expressed through its family laws.  In 2006, the Washington State Supreme 
Court held in that the state DOMA enacted in 1998, which prohibits same-sex 
marriage, does not violate the state or federal constitution.237  Using only a 
rational basis standard, it, like New York’s high court in Hernandez, found that 
promoting and protecting procreation and raising children was the purpose of the 
legislation and that its over- and under-inclusiveness with regard to this goal did 
not make it unreasonable.  In 2007, Washington adopted a domestic partnership 
law according a small number of the benefits and obligations of marriage to 
same-sex couples (and older opposite-sex couples for whom marriage is 
impractical) and greatly expanded this number in 2008.  The legislative findings 
are striking in signaling that “intimate, committed, and exclusive relationships” 
formed by such persons are of both individual and public importance: they 
provide a “private source of mutual support for the financial, physical, and 
emotional health of those individuals and their families.”238  The legislature 
further states that “the public has an interest in providing a legal framework for 
such mutually supportive relationships,” irrespective of sexual orientation.239  In 
early 2009 (as I finish this article), the sponsor of the 2007 domestic partnership 
law has introduced a bill intended to expand the “rights and responsibilities of 
state registered domestic partners” to the point that “for all purposes under state 
law, [they] shall be treated the same as married spouses.”240  Similar to the 
incremental strategy of legislators in California, the sponsors seek to provide 
“everything but marriage,” but also prefer full marriage equality and harbor the 
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hope that this incremental strategy will help people “understand what marriage is, 
and that it gets them more comfortable with treating all families with equal 
dignity and respect.”241  However, they view a bill for same-sex marriage, 
introduced simultaneously, as unlikely to succeed.  What family values are 
expressed in Washington’s family law?  As I have explored elsewhere, the 
messages sent may be in tension and may evidence family law’s multiple and 
often conflicting functions.242  For example, defense of marriage laws – upheld 
by state courts – hold on to the expressive and channelling functions of law by 
retaining the definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, but 
domestic partnership laws manifest the facilitative and protective functions of 
family law by bringing nonmarital relationships with certain qualities 
(commitment, exclusivity) under a protective umbrella of state recognition and 
support. Indeed, one could argue that by affording a legal framework for 
“mutually supportive relationships,” the law expresses public interest in such 
relationships and channels people into such relationships by affixing benefits and 
obligations to that status. Once a state starts down this path of creating an 
alternative legal status because it has an interest in families other than marital 
families, it becomes harder to justify excluding such families from all the 
benefits and obligations of civil marriage. As the recent litigation in California 
and Connecticut suggests, once same-sex couples have this packet but under a 
different name, then practical and constitutional questions arise as to why they 
should not also have the nomenclature of marriage.  And yet, as Proposition 8 
and other defense of marriage laws illustrate, many citizens in some blue states 
are not ready to take that step, even if they can live with legislation that appeals 
to values of fairness, equality, and nondiscrimination among families.   
I would invite Cahn and Carbone to reflect more on these puzzles.  One 
lacuna in Cahn and Carbone’s analysis that, if addressed, might help us better to 
examine the role of courts is a consideration of the different pathways that blue 
states have traveled to secure some degree of marriage equality for same-sex 
couples.243  In some states, legislatures enacted civil union laws and domestic 
partnerships laws and even, in California, laws allowing same-sex couples to 
marry, without the spur of a court order.  In others, such a lawsuit sparked a 
legislative remedy.  Of what significance are these different pathways to the 
consideration of the values polarization issue?  Does their “new middle class 
morality” model help to explain these different pathways followed in different 
“blue” states? 
Examining some of the high court decisions, such as in Vermont and 
Massachusetts, readily suggests that the constitutional conclusions reached in 
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Baker and Goodridge were made easier by the extent to which the family law in 
each state – as reflected in legislation as well as judicial rulings – had moved 
away from a unitive, or conjugal, model of family and toward a model that 
facilitates different pathways to family formation and parenthood.  Arguably, 
these decisions have not been overruled by popular referenda or constitutional 
amendment – to date – because the courts did not get too far ahead of public 
opinion, or at least the legislature, on this issue.244  The types of argument the 
State advanced were hard to reconcile with the facilitative steps in this direction 
already taken by the legislature.  At the same time, even Goodridge 
acknowledged the continuing favored place of civil marriage as a “cornucopia” 
of benefits and obligation for married partners and their children, many of which 
were not available outside of marriage.245  Redefining marriage to include same-
sex couples, on this view, is important precisely because the state continues to 
channel people into marriage, not through punishing its alternatives with the 
criminal law, but through the carrot of offering the most complete set of 
relational benefits and obligations in marriage.  The unitive model’s ideal of 
locating parenting within marriage has been preserved, but transformed because 
parents here do not produce children through a heterosexual union and one or 
both parents may not have a biological relationship to their children. 
The preference for the civil union or domestic partnership remedy within 
blue states seems, to me, to suggest the ongoing hold of some remnant of the 
traditional model of marriage.  If marriage simply has been and must continue to 
be “about” a relationship between one man and one woman, then what, on this 
view, does marriage mean, if not something about the uniting of the two sexes?  
It is not so clear to me, in other words, that access to civil marriage by gay men 
and lesbians has become, in blue states, a matter of basic equality.  What is clear 
is that some blue states believe that basic equality and fairness requires some 
legal recognition and protection of same-sex relationships, even if not the 
nomenclature of marriage. 
E.  California as a Test Case for the Cahn-Carbone Red v. Blue Family Law 
Model 
If In re Marriage Cases comfortably fits Dworkin’s interpretative 
framework about the centrality of dignity to a sound understanding of what 
supposedly unites Americans despite the red/blue divide, how does it fit with 
Cahn and Carbone’s notion of the ascent of a newer model of family law and 
family lives?  There is some degree of fit, but what particularly warrants 
comment is how the California Supreme Court’s opinion might be viewed as 
“conservative” in the sense of drawing on, but also applying in more inclusive 
ways, certain traditional arguments about the importance of marriage.246 
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In ruling that gay male and lesbian couples were entitled to marry, the 
Supreme Court of California emphatically stressed the continuing importance of 
marriage both for individuals and for society.247  In doing so, it drew on many 
traditional arguments about why marriage matters.  In this sense, the California 
ruling might be read as conservative: It recognizes and seeks to preserve the 
important functions of marriage, in an age when many couples simply cohabit, 
and many people opt to be single by choice.  Thus, it would seem to pay more 
heed to a “unitive” model of marriage – in the sense of encouraging the stability 
of a sexually intimate relationship and in combining adult commitment with 
parental commitment – than the Cahn-Carbone view of blue state family law 
might predict.  
At the same time, the Court’s opinion is also progressive, for it concludes 
that appeals to history and tradition alone are insufficient constitutional bases for 
excluding same-sex couples from this fundamental institution.248  It also 
considers and rejects a number of contemporary arguments made by the marriage 
movement against redefining marriage.249  In doing so, it preserves, even as it 
transforms, a number of traditional arguments about why marriage matters.250 
Why is marriage fundamental?  The California court offers perhaps the 
richest account to date by a state high court of why marriage is a vital social 
institution, significant both to society and to those who marry.251  It emphasizes 
the unique role of marriage in providing “official recognition” to a family 
relationship.252  In doing so, the court makes use of several traditional arguments 
typically used by opponents of same-sex marriage, including the channelling 
function, which Cahn and Carbone link particularly with the red state model of 
marriage.  Precisely because marriage is – as conservatives often have argued – 
unique in offering couples societal respect and dignity, the court reasoned that 
the state cannot deny it to same-sex couples without undermining constitutional 
guarantees of rights of privacy, liberty, and equality.  
From a long line of federal and state precedents about liberty, privacy, and 
the right to marry, the California court distills one basic idea: the fundamental 
right to marry embraces the right of an individual to establish, with a loved one 
of his or her choice, an officially recognized family relationship.253  Because civil 
marriage provides the institutional framework for families to secure such 
recognition, the state cannot relegate same-sex couples to an alternative, albeit 
equivalent status without denying them a “core element” of the right to marry.254  
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What is society’s interest in marriage?  First, the court tells us, there is the 
channelling function of the family, as the “basic unit of our society.”255  Older 
California cases state that the family “channels biological drives that might 
otherwise become socially destructive,” giving order to sexuality and 
procreation.256  Second, civil marriage facilitates parents’ providing for “the care 
and education of children in a stable environment.”257  Third, society relies on 
marital and family relationships, which are attended by legal obligations of 
support, to provide crucial care for dependents and to relieve the public from, or 
at least share with it, the burden of support.  Society favors marriage by linking 
many rights and responsibilities to it.258 
For many reasons, the court explains, marriage is also of “fundamental 
significance” for those who seek to marry.259  It offers “the most socially 
productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the 
course of a lifetime.”260  Indeed, constitutional precedents speak of it as part of 
the “pursuit of happiness.”261  The court notes that, of course, people can have 
and raise children outside of marriage, but “the institution of civil marriage 
affords official governmental sanction and sanctuary to the family unit.”262  Civil 
marriage – as a public statement – affords persons a public affirmation of 
commitment and a form of self-expression.  It also enmeshes married persons in 
a broader network of extended family, as well as in the broader family social 
structure that is a vital part of community life.  Families provide a place in which 
personality may be developed, intimate association pursued, and values and 
commitments generated that reach beyond the family.  
Those who argue against extending marriage to same-sex couples often 
appeal to some of these traditional functions of marriage, particularly the 
channelling function.  This argument prevailed, as noted above, in Hernandez v. 
Robles,263 in which New York’s highest court rejected a constitutional challenge 
by same-sex couples to New York’s marriage laws, and featured in a dissent in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.264  
Opponents of same-sex-marriage argued before the California Supreme 
Court that because of the historical link between marriage and procreation, the 
constitutional right to marry should be limited to opposite-sex couples.265  
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Altering the definition of marriage, they argued, would send a message that 
marriage no longer has to do with procreation, or with a child’s needing a mother 
and a father.266  
The California court cogently rejected those arguments.  It stated that 
although channelling procreation may be a reason for marriage, the constitutional 
right to marry has never been confined only to couples capable of procreating.267  
Moreover, promoting “responsible procreation” among heterosexuals is not a 
constitutionally sufficient reason to deny same-sex couples the fundamental right 
to marry.268  The state’s goal of encouraging stable two-parent family 
relationships can be served by extending the benefits of marriage to same-sex 
couples, who often raise children together.  Here, same-sex couples, too, can be 
channelled to serve society’s interest in family stability. 
The California court also observes that, although providing a stable setting 
for procreation and childrearing is one important purpose of marriage, it is not 
the only one.269  The court rightly stresses marriage as an adult relationship.  
State and federal precedents link marriage to adult happiness and to personal 
enrichment.270  Here, one could say that the court draws more on what Cahn and 
Carbone would call the evolving blue state view of marriage, as about adult 
commitment instead of, primarily, organizing procreation.  Moreover, the 
California court points out that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutional right of married couples to use contraception.271  Of course, the fact 
that Griswold is from 1967 suggests that important seeds of this so-called blue 
state, or commitment, model of marriage, were sown nearly 40 years ago. 
The California court also considers and rejects another argument made by 
the marriage movement: the contention that allowing same-sex couples to marry 
will “send a message” that marriage has nothing to do with procreation and child 
rearing, and that it is “immaterial” to the state whether a child is raised by her or 
his biological parents.272  But, the court held, recognizing the constitutional rights 
of same-sex couples to marry diminishes neither the constitutional rights of 
opposite sex couples nor the legal responsibilities of biological parents.273  If 
anything, the court concluded, recognizing these rights “simply confirms that a 
stable two-parent family relationship, supported by the state’s official recognition 
and protection, is equally as important for the numerous children in California 
who are being raised by same-sex couples as for those being raised by opposite-
sex couples.”274  As New York’s Chief Justice Kaye wrote in her dissent to 
Hernandez: “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.”275 
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In sum, the recent California high court opinion suggests more an 
adaptation and transformation than a rejection of the channelling function of 
family law and of the related idea of marriage as combining sex, procreation, and 
parenthood.  No doubt California’s legislature and its high court have concluded 
that the “unitive” view, if taken to be a conjugal model speaking just to 
organizing heterosexuality, is too narrow a view of marriage.  Emphasizing the 
goods that flow to adults from the adult-adult aspect of marriage recognizes that 
marriage fosters individual and social goods apart from procreation and 
parenthood.  But they also continue to accept the premise of the role of marriage 
in organizing family life in a way beneficial to adults, children, and society, by 
affording social sanction and support to encourage a stable, two-parent family.  
The advent of domestic partnerships and civil unions might seem, on one view, 
an opportunity to break free of the hold of marriage as such a central organizing 
institution and to explore alternative forms (opened up, for example, to opposite 
sex couples as well).  Perhaps if there were not evidence of unequal treatment 
afforded to partners in these new legal statuses as they sought to claim the 
tangible benefits linked to spousal status, the California court might have been 
more willing to defer to the democratic process to give (as New Jersey’s court 
suggested) these “new social and family relationships” time to catch on and the 
new labels time to “find [a] place in our common vocabulary.”276  However, so 
long as the surrounding society continues to view marriage as the gold standard 
of state recognition of intimacy and family life, those alternative forms cannot 
yield substantive equality. 
III.  EPILOGUE: BEYOND POLARIZATION TO “COMMON 
VALUES”? 
The language of value polarization and of red states and blue states 
hearkens from recent presidential elections, most notably, that of 2004.  But since 
this symposium took place, there has been a new election and the United States 
of America elected Barack Obama as its next president.  President Obama, in his 
campaigns, strenuously resisted the idea of a red America and a blue America or 
red States and blue States.277  He instead appealed to the “United States” of 
America and to “values we hold in common as Americans.”278  Undeniably, the 
troubling economy played a salient role in his election and his success in some 
red states.  Nonetheless, his emphasis on the role of faith in public life and his 
talk about strong families, personal responsibility, and “social Gospel” types of 
values evidently resonated for many religious and so-called “values voters.”279   
                                                                                                                         
 
276 See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 223(N.J. 2006) 
(observing that, “in time,” civil union label will “take hold”). 
277 North Carolina Primary Night, Raleigh, NC, May 6, 2008, http://obamaspeeches.com (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2009) (speech by Senator Obama). 
278 Obama’s Speech in Canton, Ohio, supra note 36. 
279 Joel Mowbray, Who Elected Barack Obama? Conservative Voters Become a Key Bloc, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at A17; Peter Steinfels, Catholics and Choice (in the Voting Booth), N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A21. 




In his inaugural address, President Obama exhorted Americans to unite to 
address the problems the Nation faces by returning to the “old” and “true” values 
on which America’s success depends: “honesty and hard work, courage and fair 
play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism.”280  Strikingly absent from 
this list is a reference to family values, although he did praise the unsung labor of 
a parent who nurtures a child.  But what might he say about family values? 
Clearly, the practical challenges faced by families – including economic crises 
and work/family conflict – are on his agenda.  But it will be important to see 
what kind of leadership he provides on some of the more divisive and 
challenging family values issues.  For example, Obama’s effort to move beyond 
value polarization may be evident in his choice of Reverend Rick Warren, an 
opponent of both abortion and same-sex marriage, to deliver the opening prayer 
at the Inauguration.  On the other hand, the stark contrast between President 
Obama and Reverend Warren on whether there should be a legal right to abortion 
raises question about common ground, beyond the possible common ground that 
there should be fewer unwanted pregnancies.  What about same-sex marriage?  
Like most other Democratic leaders in recent times, Obama does not support 
same-sex marriage because of his personal understanding of what marriage is, 
but he does support civil unions for same-sex couples and repealing the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act so civil union partners are also eligible for federal 
benefits.  Obama’s stance on this issue appeals to living up to America’s 
“founding promise of equality by treating all its citizens with dignity and 
respect.”281  He also appeals to federalism and opposes a Federal Marriage 
Amendment: states should be free to decide on their own “how best to pursue 
equality for gay and lesbian couples – whether that means a domestic 
partnership, a civil union, or a civil marriage.”282  Thus, a conservative religious 
leader and a Democratic, arguably progressive, President are united in resisting a 
change to the definition of civil marriage because of a particular religious 
understanding of the term.  This conflation of civil and religious marriage, to the 
extent it is shared by people in red, blue, and purple states, remains a significant 
obstacle to opening up marriage to same-sex couples.  What remains to be seen is 
whether there is any common ground possible between Reverend Warren and 
President Obama on where these couples and other nonmarital families fit into 
the fabric of American families and the array of family values.  And how will this 
translate into the domain of family law and constitutional law?  Obama suggests 
one way to resist division on the issue of marriage is to recognize “common 
ground” or a “quietly” forging consensus that gay and lesbian couples “should be 
treated with dignity” and have some core of protections, like hospital visitations 
and health care benefits.283  (The expansive scope of many state defense of 
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marriage laws casts doubt on any consensus on this score.)  What does treating 
someone with dignity entail? As I have argued in this article, this strategy of 
incremental equality reflects a dramatically transformed landscape from the era 
of Bowers v. Hardwick.  It evidences an expanding conception of family 
relationships and of society’s interest in supporting such families.  At the same 
time, the inevitable question arises: what justifies moving this far toward full 
equality – or distributive fairness – but no further? 
In conclusion, as the debate over these matters continues, it may be useful 
to return to a question posed after the issuance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
much-criticized decision in Bowers v. Hardwick: what is the proper place of 
moral argument in judicial reasoning about contested issues?  Political theorist 
Michael Sandel criticized the majority for its empty assertion of majoritarianism 
as a basis for upholding the criminal ban, and the dissent for its appeal to empty 
liberal toleration.284  A better argument, he contended, must engage the issue of 
the substantive moral goods at stake lest the intimate lives of homosexuals are 
tolerated but not respected.  
After Lawrence v. Texas, Sandel observed that, to some extent, Justice 
Kennedy, in his statement that “liberty presumes an autonomy of self,” drew on 
“the autonomy-based, nonjudgmental line of reasoning” of which Sandel is 
critical.285  However, he praised Justice Kennedy’s opinion for “gesturing” 
toward a more “substantive” reason for the Texas law: it “wrongly demeaned a 
morally legitimate mode of life.”286  Privacy rights matter, the Court elaborated, 
because of the human goods of intimacy.287  Sandel notes that the Court also 
sought to move beyond “liberal toleration” to “affirm the moral legitimacy of 
homosexuality,” when it noted the stigma created by criminal laws banning 
same-sex, but not opposite-sex, sodomy.288  Just as liberals, Sandel suggests, 
were “freeing themselves from the assumption that privacy rights can be 
adjudicated without reference to the moral status of the practices that rights 
protect,”289 conservatives were embracing it.  In declaring that there is a valid 
state interest for the law, Justice Scalia’s dissent simply expresses a “value-
neutral commitment to majoritarianism” rather than defend the antisodomy law 
on its merits.290  Sandel concludes by noting the “difficulty of bracketing moral 
judgment, whether in the name of respecting individual choice or deferring to 
majoritarian sentiment.”291 
I believe that contemporary debates over family definition inevitably entail 
engaging – rather than bracketing – moral judgment, political morality, and 
values.  This seems especially true as debates turn from the use of the criminal 
law to distributive questions about access to resources (such as civil marriage) 
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and affirmative governmental responsibility.  Of continuing importance is a 
strong liberal principle of affording people space to make decisions about their 
intimate lives.292  The shift in family law in blue and some red states toward a 
functional definition of family responds to the fact of greater diversity, but also 
may reflect a judgment about the value of such diversity.293  Anxieties continue 
about what sorts of diversity are beneficial for children, adults, and the broader 
society.  But arguments about the goods and values that are at stake in these 
family debates are part of the contemporary landscape.  
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